Monday, February 2, 2015

AUGUSTINE OF HIPPO (354-430)


“There is something that’s truly sublime,
When you want some, it won’t cost a dime.
While feeling its presence
You don’t know its essence,
It’s the greatest of mysteries: time.”


Note: Augustine is famous for having said, in his Confessions, that if no one asks him what time is, then he knows what it is, whereas if someone asks him what time is, then he doesn’t know what it is.  Augustine and I disagree about this: even if someone doesn’t ask me what time is, I still don’t know what it is.  That shouldn’t be much of a surprise: no-one (except perhaps my colleague, Craig Callender) knows what time is.  (He must know what it is, because he’s never late.  Not even to a faculty meeting.)    

Sunday, February 1, 2015

JESUS CHRIST (6/4 BCE – 30/33 AD)
  

It’s a challenge to find the best rule,
One that, ethically speaking, is cool.
For the Christian it’s stressed
That the Golden one’s best,
Though to sadists the Christian’s a fool.


Note: More irreverence.  The Golden Rule (Matthew 7:12) has a long and distinguished history.  The rule says: “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.”  For generations this rule has been the compass by which Christians have been told to steer.  But it has some potential drawbacks.  If I am a masochist and would have others cause me pain (because I enjoy it), then the Golden Rule tells me (that it is permissible) to cause pain to others.  Sadists will chuckle at this, because it turns out that their activities appear to have Jesus’s blessing.  Immanuel Kant (see below) criticizes the Golden Rule in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals because, contrary to Jesus’s own design, it turns out to justify the refusal of selfish persons to help others in need, as long as those selfish persons would not themselves wish to be helped.  Kant’s own Categorical Imperative (“Act according to that maxim that you can will to be a universal law”) clearly resembles the Golden Rule in its appeal to some form of universalization.  But I imagine that Kant might have said that if it was God who spoke to Jesus, then something of importance was lost in translation.    

Saturday, January 31, 2015

JESUS CHRIST (6/4 BCE – 30/33 AD)

  
“We should all give our shirts to the poor,
If you won’t even tithe, you’re a boor.
Give a hand to the weak,
And encourage the meek,
Or miss out on God’s heavenly tour.”



Note: This is my irreverent rendition of what is probably Jesus’s most philosophical work, the Sermon on the Mount (Matthew 5-7).  George W. Bush famously said, in response to a question while on the Presidential campaign trail in 2000, that Jesus was his favorite philosopher.  Perhaps Bush was thinking of the Sermon on the Mount.  If so, then it might have helped if Bush had actually read it.  (I believe that the Sermon says something about turning the other cheek and not judging others lest one be judged, which are just those precepts the Bush administration followed when it engaged in pre-emptive war against Iraq in 2003, killing thousands of young conscripts and innocent civilians in the absence of any compelling evidence of weapons of mass destruction under Saddam Hussein’s control.)  I have to say that I like the idea of helping, and identifying with, the poor and the weak.  This Christian message continues to resonate today.  But the tone of this limerick is irreverent, because Jesus does not make clear whether the motive for helping the weak should be a desire for salvation (which, as I see it, would be the wrong sort of motive) or a commitment to the right and the good (which, on my view, would be the right sort of motive).    

Friday, January 30, 2015

BONUS LIMERICK: A TRIBUTE TO RICHARD AQUILA

When I first started composing limericks, I knew that some enterprising philosophers (including a graduate student at UNC, Larisa Svirsky, at philimericks.tumblr.com) had been writing some and posting them on the internet (thank you, Larisa!).  What I didn't know is that one philosopher in particular, Richard E. Aquila, had completed the truly Herculean task of writing an entire history of Western philosophy in limericks, and had published the result as a book, Rhyme or Reason: A Limerick History of Philosophy (University Press of America, 1981).  The book contains, I kid you not, 403 limericks.  I counted them all.  (Let me know if I miscounted, Richard, please.)  Many of the poems are combined into narratives.  As I read this book, with respect to some philosophers I almost lost track of the fact that I was reading poetry.  It's a stupendous achievement, one that dwarfs my one-a-day limerick vitamin project.  For those of you who like philosophy, poetry, and humor, look for this book in your local library (it's out of print), and ask University Press of America to re-issue it.    

In Professor Aquila's honor, I have composed a bonus limerick, and am sharing it with you:

Let's thank the great Richard Aquila,
The ultimate theory distilla.
For me, Rhyme or Reason
Is brilliant, no teasin':
Eclipsing sublime Friedrich Schilla.

THE SKEPTICS (3rd CENTURY BCE)


““Don’t judge!” is the smartest position
To take on the human condition.”
So the skeptic averred,
Wanting this, her last word,
To serve as a sure proposition.


Note: Pyrrho of Elis and his followers (Pyrrhonian Skeptics, notably Aenesidemus and Sextus Empiricus) strove for a kind of mental tranquility that could be produced, they thought, by putting appearances and/or thoughts in opposition, creating a kind of equipollence that leads to mental stasis or suspension of judgment that is itself tranquility-conferring.  Pyrrhonian Skeptics railed against dogmatism.  The main problem for any Pyrrhonian, of course, is that if she wants to preserve the internal consistency of her theory, she will need to suspend judgment about the truth of her own philosophical theory (or whatever it is that is supposed to serve as the ground or basis of her recommendations for achieving tranquility of mind).  She will then be a Skeptic who suspends judgment about the truth of Skepticism.  Some Pyrrhonian Skeptics might think that the best way around this problem is not to put Skepticism forward as a theory or recipe (thanks to UCSD graduate student, Andrew Wong, for this suggestion), but to simply deploy Skeptical arguments that are designed to produce equipollence in response to any dogmatic claim.  Skepticism now becomes no more than a method for producing mental tranquility.  But now the problem is that if you ask the Skeptic why she is trying to produce tranquility or what she thinks the best way of producing tranquility is, she will not be able to offer you a theory in reply.  This is a strangely unsatisfying philosophical stance.    

Thursday, January 29, 2015

EPICURUS (341-270 BCE)
  
’Twas an old Epicurean sheep
Who thought death was no different from sleep.
As he lay down to die
To his friends he did cry,
“Boy, I sure hope that nap ain't too deep!”


Note: According to Epicurus, we only have reason to fear painful or unpleasant experiences.  But we all cease to exist when we are dead.  It follows that, when dead, we do not experience anything painful or unpleasant.  Hence, there is no call for us to fear death.  Lucretius (99-55 BCE) defends Epicureanism in On the Nature of Things.  There he explicitly draws an analogy between death and sleep.  Of course, thanks to my Jewish upbringing, I know that there is something profoundly mistaken about Epicureanism.  But it turns out to be difficult to explain exactly what the nature of the error is.  Oy, as if there weren’t already enough to worry about…

Wednesday, January 28, 2015

THE STOICS (3rd CENTURY BCE)


If your impression’s cataleptic,
That will make Sextus quite dyspeptic.
But if what you’re seeing
Is not guaranteeing,
Then it’s advantage to the skeptic.


Note: The Stoic school (which met at the porch in the Athenian agora) began and flourished in the 3rd century BCE, under its first three leaders, Zeno of Citium, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus.  According to the Stoics, some of our (sense) impressions (in part because of their vividness and coherence) can be recognized as true reflections of a mind-independent reality, while others (e.g., incoherent or hazy dreamlike states) are not.  Impressions of the former kind Stoics called “cataleptic impressions”.  But Stoics were criticized by Skeptics (including Sextus Empiricus, 160-210), who thought that some impressions Stoics wanted to categorize as non-cataleptic (e.g., vivid and coherent hallucinations) were in fact indistinguishable from the cataleptic ones.