Tuesday, January 27, 2015

ARISTOTLE (384-322 BCE)


To make Aristotle eudaimon
What’s needed is reason and backbone,
Discharging each duty,
Friends, wealth, kids, and beauty,
And lastly a gleaming new iPhone.


Note: (This limerick is dedicated to my colleague, David Brink, from whom I have learned so much about ancient Greek ethics.)  Eudaimonia is the Greek word for doing well or faring well, usually, but also somewhat misleadingly, translated as “happiness”.  According to Aristotle, eudaimonia requires both (a) rational activity in accordance with virtue (including courage, or "backbone") over a complete life and (b) “external goods”, themselves of two kinds: those that make the expression of virtue possible (as in the possession of wealth and friends, which make beneficence actualizable), and those that don’t (e.g. beauty, having good children).  There is a Yiddish saying: Without luck, nothing will succeed.  Ergo: Aristotle spoke Yiddish.
 

Monday, January 26, 2015

ARISTOTLE (384-322 BCE)


“It’s matter and form that make substance,
Bronze shape is a statue, for instance.
But form’s own existence
Needs matter’s persistence:
This breeds theoretic resistance.”


Note: According to Aristotle, individual substances (such as President Obama and the Eiffel Tower) are things that are neither said of nor present in anything else.  (By contrast, for example, tallness can be said of Obama and is present in him, so tallness is not a substance.)  These substances are matter-form composites (hylomorphism).  So, for example, every statue is composed of matter (whatever it was made out of, say a lump of bronze) and form (the statue’s shape, which is what makes the statue the statue that it is).  But the form of a substance is not separable from its matter: if the lump of bronze ceases to exist, so does the statue’s shape.  This makes sense in the statue case.  But Aristotle also claims that human beings are substances, that a human being’s form is its soul and its matter is its body (or flesh, blood, and bone).  If form is not separable from matter, it follows that the soul of a human being is not separable from the human’s body.  This becomes a serious issue for Christians in the Middle Ages (Scholastics) who want to preserve the possibility of life after death within the main lines of Aristotelian metaphysics.

Sunday, January 25, 2015

ARETE OF CYRENE (4th CENTURY BCE)
  

Arete’s a great Cyrenaic,
Her theory is very prosaic.
What’s good is just pleasure,
Of wellness the measure,
Without getting too formulaic.


Note: Arete of Cyrene (an ancient Greek colony in Northern Africa, now in Eastern Libya) was the daughter of Aristippus, whom Plato (in the Phaedo) lists among those who were not, but who would have wanted to be, at Socrates’ side when he drank the hemlock in 399 BCE.  Aristippus moved to Athens, taking Arete with him, and founded a school (of Cyrenaics), heavily influenced by some of Socrates’ statements, including the claim that the good is pleasure (a claim that Plato attributes to his character “Socrates” in the Protagoras).  Arete learned Cyrenaic philosophy from her father, and later married and gave birth to a son, whom she called “Aristippus” in honor of her father and whom she (contrary to existing customs) taught herself.  It is thanks to Arete’s son that we know as much as we do now (which isn’t much, unfortunately) about the Cyrenaic school.  And we have her to thank for the fact that her son was so well trained in philosophy.

Saturday, January 24, 2015

PLATO (429-347 BCE)

  
“Human heads are both large and quite small,
It’s not thanks to what’s small that you’re tall.
If you think that your wig
Makes you bigger than big,
Then you're wrong, and your theory must fall.”


Note 0: I made a small change to this limerick, following a judicious correction offered by Margaret Dancy, whose limericking powers exceed mine by a long shot.  Thank you, Margaret!

Note 1: In the Phaedo, Plato’s mouthpiece, Socrates, claims that as a young man he used to believe that causes were material things, that the cause of human growth is eating and drinking, and that the cause of X’s being taller than Y is X’s head (because X is taller “by a head”).  Now, he says, he no longer accepts this.  One of his reasons is that the human head is small, and nothing that is small can be the cause of anything big (or tall).  At bottom, Plato is articulating a theory of causation that was taken for granted by philosophers (and scientists) for almost two thousand years.  According to this theory, nothing can make something else have a certain property unless it has that property itself.  The favorite example of this was heat: only hot things can make other things hot (by transferring heat to them).  Importantly, nothing cold can make something hot, and nothing hot can make something cold.  (The first person to draw my attention to this important theory of causation was Russ Dancy, my former colleague at Florida State University.  When I was a mere babe of an assistant professor, he ran a fantastic seminar on Plato's Parmenides that I attended, and I was hooked on Plato forever.)

Note 2: Actually, looking back over old emails, I found a (meter-wise imperfect) limerick I wrote for Russ and Margaret Dancy in 2009.  This blog gives me the opportunity to share it with you, as a token of gratitude to both of them:

There was an old man called Parmenides
Who was given to writing inanidies
He once said, "The One
Is not many, my son,"
Which gave Plato no end of anxiedies.

Note 3: Plato's Parmenides features the character Socrates.  But this time Socrates gets his comeuppance.  After Socrates has sketched out the Theory of Forms for which Plato is famous, Parmenides outlines five main criticisms that, to all appearances, doom the theory.  But then Parmenides changes tack and claims that there is a way to rescue the theory from the criticisms (well, maybe not from the fifth one, commonly known as The Greatest Difficulty), and proceeds to run through a series of roughly 180 arguments, divided into eight (or nine) sections, about the form of unity: The One.  The start of the first argument is: "If The One is (alternative translation: if it is one), The One would not be many, would it?"  This seems kind of nutty, but it all makes sense in the end.  It took me a couple of years to figure it out.  For more on this, see my contribution to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on the Parmenides: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-parmenides/.  Masochists among you might also try looking at my Plato's Forms in Transition: A Reading of the Parmenides (Cambridge University Press, 2007).  None of this would have been possible without the kind of careful interpretive work to be found in Russ Dancy's Plato's Introduction of Forms (Cambridge University Press, 2004).

Friday, January 23, 2015

Physics Limericks


For those of you interested in limericks of all sorts, not just philosophical ones, I came across this webpage full of great physics limericks created by David Morin (physics lecturer at Harvard): 

https://www.physics.harvard.edu/academics/undergrad/limericks 

Bonus! A Limerick from Seth Lerer

Professor Seth Lerer, ex-UCSD-Dean-of-Arts-and-Humanities-extraordinaire, author, scholar, polymath, winner of more awards than you can shake a stick at, and once known as "Seth Lerer", sent me this poem for the ages:


A philosopher once known as Sam,
Wrote: "I limerick, and therefore I am.
Though you'd think this task reckless,
It is far from feckless.
It's philosophy -- hardly a scam."


Thank you, Seth.





PLATO (429-347 BCE)
  

For Plato the soul is tripartite,
Three parts in perpetual dogfight.
If appetite’s naughty,
Then reason gets haughty,
And drags spirit round without respite.



Note 1: In Book 4 of his masterpiece, The Republic, Plato (now using the character “Socrates” as his mouthpiece) argues that the soul has three parts: Reason (the reasoning and planning part, whose function is to control the other two parts for the sake of the good of the whole soul), Spirit (the part responsible for anger, whose function is to assist Reason in controlling the third part of the soul), and Appetite (the part responsible for base desires, for such things as food, drink, and sex).  In a virtuous soul, Plato says, the three parts harmonize with each other, with Appetite and Spirit both accepting Reason’s rightful rule, and Appetite subordinating itself to Spirit’s strictures.  But in a vicious soul, the three parts are at odds with each other, with each claiming the mantle of the soul’s ruler.  For the sake of the soul’s good, we have to hope in each case that Reason wins the battle for supremacy.

Note 2: "Respite" should be pronounced with the accent on the first syllable and as rhyming with "tripartite" and "dogfight".  For those of you in the UK, this will not be a stretch.  For those of you in the United States, pretend that you are a Shakespearean actor or something.

Note 3: A former UCSD graduate student and all-around good guy, Per-Erik Milam, writes with fascinating news.  It appears that recent psychological studies give us reason to believe that poetry can be used to affect philosophical intuitions (that is, considered judgments at all levels of generality, but usually about particular cases, such as whether to turn a runaway trolley away from five innocent persons onto a track where one innocent person is trapped) via unconscious mechanisms.  Perhaps, suggested Per, I could achieve immortality by turning my philosophical papers into verse.  I love the idea (which has been tried before: Hector Monro, "The Sonneteer's History of Philosophy", Philosophy (1980): 363-375 -- thanks to Irwin Primer, Professor Emeritus of English Literature, Rutgers University, for the reference; and Richard E. Aquila's Rhyme or Reason: A Limerick History of Philosophy, University Press of America, 1981).  But I think I can go one better.  So here goes:

DEAR PER

What a sneaky idea! You are right
That for justice and truth I must fight.
A small favor I'd ask
To accomplish the task:
A fat check in the mail by tonight...